By chanting in this way their separatist temptations, many Sindhis expressed the feeling of being directly targeted by the killing of the woman they affectionately called “Bibi” (sister) or “Sindh Rani” (the queen of Sindh). This rage was most potent in the southern Sindh province, where disturbances lasted for several days, fueled by the slogan “ Na khape, na khape, Pakistan na khape!” (We don’t want/need Pakistan). In the aftermath of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s assassination on December 27, 2007, thousands of angry protesters took to the streets in Pakistan, destroying and burning cars, trucks, trains, buses, government offices, police stations, and other state symbols. This process translated into institution-building in the cultural sphere and contributed to the political outlook of a large section of Sindhi politicians on the left of the spectrum. The article focuses on how three generations of Muslim men, who shared similar trajectories yet have unique social characteristics and repertoires of contention, constructed, reinforced, and disseminated the Sindhi nationalist discourse. It also illustrates how an aspirational middle-class played a central role in this process. Rather than address questions of failure or success, this article shows that the construction of a nationalist “idea of Sindh” has been a continuous process throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. However, few have attempted to examine what connects disparate events of ethnic violence and opposition to the central state with a broader understanding of what being Sindhi entails.
As a result, it has mainly received attention when sudden outbursts of violence seemed to threaten the stability of the state. The movement has not been examined for itself but only from the vantage point of its success or failure. The study of Sindhi nationalism has remained overdetermined by the question of the allegiance of Sindhis to the Pakistani state.
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